This paper explores the interaction and consequences of tax enforcement policies for monetary policy. Agents may evade taxes by working in an informal sector, but they are detected with positive probability. Workers are rewarded with government sponsored bene…ts which are proportional to formal (taxed) work. We show that when collecting taxes is costly, the optimal in ‡ation rate is positive and in ‡ation becomes a second best tax. Using U.S. data, we compute the quantitative e¤ect on in ‡ation and interest rate of evasion penalties and government provided bene…ts to workers in the formal sector for OECD countries. Because data are available on the amount spent to collect taxes from the informal sector, we also provide an upper bound estimate for OECD countries. This model casts doubt on the desirability and sustainability of the recent convergence in interest rates and in ‡ation in OECD countries. Eurozone countries have coordinated their monetary policies, but they lack of …scal policy coordination. The model clearly indicates that if countries have di¤erent tax enforcement policies and enforcement spending, then the optimal interest rate and in ‡ation will be di¤erent.
Introduction
This paper explores the quantitative interactions and consequences of tax enforcement policies for monetary policy. The model has a complete but costly set of tax instruments.
Agents may evade taxes, but they risk being detected with positive probability. Furthermore, while they may be penalized for evading taxes, they are rewarded with government sponsored bene…ts which are proportional to formal, reported and taxed work. We show that when tax enforcement is costly, the optimal in ‡ation rate is positive. We compute the quantitative e¤ect on in ‡ation and interest rates of evasion penalties and bene…ts.
Optimal in ‡ation and interest rates di¤er across countries and di¤erences in tax enforcement policies can account for the results, given the same enforcement spending for all countries. We show that the e¤ects of the bene…ts are stronger, suggesting that reward policies are more desirable than deterrence policies.
In order to analyze quantitatively the e¤ects of tax enforcement policies, we calibrate our model for the United States. Country speci…c tax enforcement policies are then used in the calibrated model, keeping all other parameters …xed. We show how the optimal in ‡ation and interest rates are a¤ected by tax enforcement policies (tax rate, evasion penalty and bene…t), given a enforcement spending technology. My analysis leads to two important lessons for policymaking, namely (i) …scal policies a¤ect in ‡ation and interest rates because they alter the distortion arising from labor tax evasion and avoidance; and (ii) structural conditions and institutions constrain the set of …scal policy tools and must be considered in the formulation of optimal monetary policy. Monetary policies that keep nominal interest rates and in ‡ation low are constrained optimal only when these structural distortions are reduced. the Euro area only if it had an in ‡ation rate no higher than 1:5 percent points above the three best-performing member states and a nominal long-term interest rate no more than 2 percent points above the three best-performing member states. These criteria were also reinforced with further rules that annual budget de…cits could be no more than 3 percent of the GDP and accumulated public debt no greater that 60 percent of the GDP. As Figure 1 illustrates, interest rate and in ‡ation di¤erentials across the Euro area countries diminished substantially. In the early 1990s, the range between high and low rates across European countries was 10 percentage points or more. By 1999, the range from the highest to lowest in ‡ation rate had dropped to 2 4 percent. On the other hand, the …scal criteria were not strictly achieved by all countries, for instance, Belgium, Greece and Italy (Lane, 2006) . This paper analyzes the following question: Is this recent convergence in in ‡ation and interest rates optimal when markedly di¤erent …scal policies are followed? We answer this question by conducting a quantitative analysis of the relationship between in ‡ation and interest rates with …scal policy (i.e., the tax enforcement spending, bene…ts and penalties) in OECD countries, except the Transition Economies, Iceland and Luxembourg. We focus on the case where government detection is imperfect and penalties are bounded (i.e., we rule out perfect and zero detection probabilities and in…nite penalty schemes) 1 .
This study will cast doubt upon the desirability of monetary policy convergence for these countries. Tax enforcement policies vary considerably across OECD and Euro area countries and play an important role in the determination of optimal monetary policy. 1 Previous studies have analyzed the extreme cases. Either the probability of detecting a tax evader is equal to one and the agent must pay tax on "informal" income (Jones, Manuelli and Rossi, 1997) or the government cannot detect a tax evader (informal worker), which implies a detection probability of zero. We …nd that when tax enforcement is problematic, deviations from the Friedman rule are optimal (the optimal nominal interest rate is not zero). Indeed, we show that the optimal monetary policy di¤ers from the monetary policy observed in Figure 1 , in some cases markedly. Our results raise questions regarding the desirability of monetary policy coordination when …scal and tax enforcement policies are not coordinated. The intuition for this result is the following. An ine¢ cient tax system, one characterized by tax avoidance and tax evasion, constrains the revenue sources of the government 2 . In ‡ation then becomes a "second best"tax due to the unavailability of alternative taxes. Penalties countries have di¤erent tax enforcement policies and enforcement spending, then the optimal interest rate and in ‡ation will be di¤erent.
The model is built on Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996), with three main di¤erences.
The set of tax instruments is complete but taxes are costly to collect. Agents try to evade taxes by underreporting labor income to the tax authorities or working in the informal sector, but are detected with positive probability and …ned. This paper uses the terms tax evasion and informal activities interchangeably. The government has carrot and stick policies which a¤ect agents'decisions, rewarding work in the formal sector and penalizing tax evasion. Without labor tax evasion and costly tax collection, money would not be taxed and a zero in ‡ation tax would be optimal, the Friedman rule (Friedman, 1969) .
There is extensive discussion in the literature exploring conditions for the optimality of This paper is also related to a great deal of literature on tax evasion and enforcement.
Becker (1968) argues that a government should set the penalty for evasion high and the costly monitoring probability low to maximize the ex ante utility of a representative agent. This policy deters evasion at minimal cost. The tax law literature also advocates this policy because it economizes on enforcement costs without sacri…cing deterrence and raises revenue, according to Polinsky and Shavell (2005) . The policymaker can save resources and achieve the same level of compliance by increasing penalties imposed only on dishonest taxpayers, and reducing the probability of detection.
In the original Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, high penalties and a high monitoring probability discourage cheating. However, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) argue that this kind of model ignores the possibility of a corrupt tax administrator who abuses the system or severely punishes agents who commit an honest mistake. The harsher the penalty scheme, the greater the damage. Agents may enter the underground sector to …nd shelter from such government-induced distortion as excessive taxes, regulation, weak legal systems or corruption, e.g., see Giles and Tedds (2002) or Friedman et al. (2000) .
Weaker legal systems and more corrupt environments are strongly correlated with the size of the informal economy, as will be the case in our model.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the economy and the structure of the model. We state the Ramsey problem and consider the optimality of the Friedman rule in the presence of tax evasion and costly tax collection. In Section 3, we calibrate the model and solve it numerically. The optimal monetary policy is quanti…ed in Section 4, under statutory penalties. Section 5 presents policy implications and Section 7 o¤ers concluding comments.
Model

The Environment
The economy is populated by a large number of identical, in…nitely lived consumers in discrete time. There are no information problems and markets are complete. Agents have one unit of labor that is used for leisure or to produce a single consumption good. There is no aggregate uncertainty.
The representative agent has preferences represented by a discounted lifetime utility
where c 1t is consumption of a cash good, c 2t is consumption of a credit good and h t is leisure in period t. Cash and credit goods are distinguished solely by the means of payment, which will be determined by a cash-in-advance constraint. The distinction is relevant because informal payments usually occur in cash. Let 2 (0; 1) be the discount factor and U ( ) be a strictly concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable function, separable in consumption and leisure, that satis…es the INADA conditions.
The agent is endowed with one unit of time which can be spent on formal work (l
Labor services are the only factor of production, where l 
and F l I (t) denote the marginal products of formal and informal labor and w There is a complete set of tax instruments. The government can tax all goods and services, both formal and informal labor income, but the tax on informal income is an imperfect instrument. The three distinct policy variables are the following: (i) tax rate on formal labor income ( F t ), (ii) revenue neutral bene…t (b t ) and (iii) penalty for failing to pay the formal tax rate ( t ).
We assume that the government can observe and tax the transactions occurring in the formal sector, and that the level of government spending g is …xed and determined exogenously. The tax rate by the government, is proportional to hours worked in the formal sector and is meant to capture the idea that agents working in the formal sector receive bene…ts from government services such as social security, child care and unemployment bene…ts. It also provides a way to reward agents for truthful reports. Education, roads and security services, for instance, are not considered since the government cannot exclude informal workers.
Transfers and taxes are revenue neutral.
Agents attempt to evade formal taxes by working in the informal sector, but there is a probability of being caught. Given an exogenous detection probability t , the government punishes tax evaders and informal workers by imposing a penalty t . 4 We assume that t is proportional to the amount of tax evaded and is bound. We focus on the interesting case, t 2 (1; tM ), where tM is the exogenous maximal penalty level that the government can impose; when t = 1 no penalty is imposed. The upper bound on the penalty is motivated by the fact that countries usually adopt a range for this type of penalty.
We abstract from other types of penalties such as imprisonment. We assume that the probability of detection is exogenously given and independent of government enforcement 
The Consumer
Given a probability of detection t , the consumer's problem is to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility
subject to 4 The magnitude of penalties is the object of debate in the enforcement literature. If the government is free to choose the penalties, Becker (1968) , Chander and Wilde (1998) , Krasa and Villamil (2000) , Polinsky and Shavell (2005) , among others, have shown that (extremely) severe penalties are optimal. However, less-than-maximum …nes can be optimal when enforcement is uncertain (see Polinsky and Shavell (2005) for a survey) or social norms impose economic restrictions on the penalty function (see Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin (1997) ).
where M t is money holdings, B t nominal bonds, R t the interest rate paid on bonds, p t the price level in the economy, respectively. The earnings in the formal sector are deterministic and a linear function of hours of work and the net earnings in this sector is given by 1
Regarding the agent's expected informal labor income, notice that with a given probability t the agent is caught evading tax and must pay a penalty t proportional to the amount of the tax evaded. The agent's informal income is thus stochastic 5 
Purchase of cash goods must satisfy the cash-in-advance constraint (3). Money is introduced and withdrawn through open market operations. The total time spent on 5 Because markets are complete, the agent can hedge this risk.
formal, informal work and leisure is 1, equation (4) . Ponzi schemes are ruled out by constraint (5).
The Government
The government …nances an exogenously given expenditure (g t ) through printing new money, issuing new bonds, collecting labor income taxes from formal workers, enforcing the tax code and imposing penalties on informal workers. However, it incurs costs to collect formal and informal taxes. Government spending to collect formal taxes (s F t ) is assumed to be small and constant 6 . We assume that the tax enforcement spending (s
or cost to collect informal taxes, is proportional to expected enforcement tax revenue
given by
where is interpreted as the percentage of expected enforcement revenue spent to collect taxes from the informal sector and
Given a probability of detection t , the government's period budget constraint is
The left side of equation (8) contains government expenditures (g t ), spending to collect formal and informal taxes (s 
Resource Constraint
The resource constraint in this economy is and a given probability of detection t , such that (i) given (p; ; R), the allocation sequence
solves the representative agent's utility maximization problem and (ii) given
the resource constraint is satis…ed each period. 
and the equilibrium conditions can be represented as
where t+1 = p t+1 pt pt is the in ‡ation rate.
Given that the gross nominal return on money is equal to one, in any equilibrium R t+1 1 because otherwise the consumer could make in…nite pro…ts by buying money and selling bonds. From agent equilibrium conditions (18) and (19), the condition U c 1 (t) U c 2 (t) must hold in any equilibrium.
The Ramsey Problem
The social planner's goal is to maximize a representative agent's utility subject to raising an exogenously determined amount of revenue for the government, taking into account the equilibrium reactions by consumers and …rms to the distortionary tax system. A Ramsey problem characterizes the set of allocations that can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with distorting taxes subject to a resource and implementability constraint.
Proposition 1 (Ramsey Allocation) For a given probability of detection t , the consumption and labor allocations in the Ramsey equilibrium solve the Ramsey problem
subject to
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1 follows Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996) and has two parts: ( i) Allocations in a competitive equilibrium must satisfy the implementability constraint (23) and resource constraint (21) and, conversely, ( ii) Any allocation satisfying (21), (22) , and (23) can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium.
The Ramsey planner's problem is to maximize the discounted present value of utility
(1) subject to resource constraint (9), government budget constraint (8) , and the constraints imposed by household optimization. In the …rst part of the proof, the planner chooses directly the optimal allocations. Constraint (23) is the consumer budget constraint with both taxes and prices substituted out by the …rst order conditions from the agent's utility maximization problem. (23) is the implementability constraint which restricts the set of allocations that can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with distorting taxes. To derive the implementability constraint, multiply the expected agent budget constraints by their Lagrange multipliers ( t t ) for each period, sum over t, and use the …rst order conditions of the agent's optimization problem (16) (19) . This yields the following
We assume that the government is constrained in its policy choices in the …rst period and sets the initial stock of nominal assets, M 0 + B 0 , to zero. If the initial stock is either negative or positive, welfare is maximized by setting the initial price level to either negative in…nity or in…nity, respectively. Assumption M 0 + B 0 = 0 does not a¤ect the results and simpli…es the calculations. Hence we obtain the implementability constraint
The resource constraint for this economy (21) can be represented as
Given that the gross nominal return on money is equal to one, in any equilibrium R t 1 because otherwise the consumer could make in…nite pro…ts by buying money and selling bonds. According to the agent's equilibrium conditions, constraint (22) , U c 1 (t) U c 2 (t), must hold in any equilibrium
We can construct prices and government policies such that (21), (22) , and (23) characterize the competitive equilibrium allocations. These prices and policies can be characterized by conditions (16) (19) from the agent's optimization problem. We also use the …rm's …rst-order conditions, w
denote the marginal products of formal and informal labor, and w De…ne the formal (net) tax rate and the expected penalty in each period t to be
. Also construct the interest rate as
.
Given the assumptions on the utility function, the …rst order conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for agent and …rm maximization. The price level is indeterminate and all variables in the economy can be de…ned in real terms. Real money holdings will be equal to the consumption of the cash good, The solution to the Ramsey problem is an allocation that maximizes social welfare, subject to the restriction that it can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with taxes. Equation (21) is the resource constraint taking into account the consumer problem …rst order conditions. Money earns a gross nominal return of 1 and, from the consumer problem, in equilibrium R 1. Thus, in any equilibrium constraint (22) must hold. The implementability constraint, equation (23), is a constraint on the set of allocations that can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with distorting taxes.
The Optimality of the Friedman Rule
In an economy without distortions, the optimal monetary policy is characterized by a nominal interest rate equal to zero, according to Friedman (1969) . There is an extensive discussion in the literature exploring conditions for the optimality of the Friedman rule and reasons for deviation from it. Aizenman (1983) and Vegh (1989) , for example, argue that the Friedman rule is not optimal in economies with a costly tax system. De Fiore In our economy, the government can tax labor in both sectors (or equivalently both consumption goods), but agents attempt to evade taxes by working underground. With a given positive probability, they are caught. An exogenous expected informal penalty t t is an imperfect instrument for reducing the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution of consumption and informal labor and the marginal rate of transformation.
Since tax evasion and informal activities are heavily carried out in cash and imperfectly observed by the tax authorities it is reasonable to assume that the marginal cost of taxing cash goods payments is higher that the cost of taxing credit goods, i.e. s
Moreover, purchases of credit goods are assumed to be perfectly monitored by the tax authorities, because the agent issues nominal claims, which are settled in the security market, to purchase credit goods.
Proposition 2 Assume that, given a probability of detection t 2 (0; 1] an informal worker is detected and must pay the informal tax rate on evaded income ( 
where U i (t) denotes U i (c 1t ; c 2t ; h t ), i = 1; 2; 3, 1 ; c 2 ) ; h), where w is homothetic. A utility function of this form also satis…es the following:
Dividing 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 by U 1 (t) and U 2 (t), respectively and noting that
2 we have that
Using (3:2:3), we have that the left side of (3:2:4) and (3:2:5) have the same value for i = 1 and for i = 2. This implies that t [1+s
and, consequently,
From the consumer' …rst order condition
= R t and s
, We have that R t > 1, i.e., the optimal interest rate is positive. Hence, in the presence of positive collection cost, the Friedman rule is not the optimal monetary policy. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
In a tax system with costly collection, the optimal in ‡ation tax is positive, i.e., the Friedman rule is not optimal. When the informal sector cannot be perfectly observed and money is used for transactions in this sector, the optimal policy is to set a positive in ‡ation tax, in addition to two other distortionary tax instruments, namely a positive formal income tax ( given by the following:
where c 1t , c 2t and h t denote the cash good, the credit good and leisure in period t, respectively. The preference parameters , and v represent the work-leisure time allocation, the cash-credit goods weight and the coe¢ cient of risk aversion, respectively.
As in Easterly (1993), aggregate output is given by a constant returns to scale production function in the following form:
Output is a function of the two types of labor, formal (l For an economy with utility function (24) and production function (25) , the Ramsey problem is to choose consumption and labor allocations that solve the following optimization problem:
The expression for the optimal interest rate for this economy is obtained by the procedure described in the proof of Proposition 2, with preferences and production function given by (24) and (25), respectively.
Calibration Strategy
We calibrate the model for the United States, the baseline economy. Suppose that government consumption expenditures (g t ) are constant and assume that the solution to the Ramsey problem converges to a steady state. We solve for the optimal steady state interest rate in terms of preference and production parameters. The parameters of the model are , v, , , , . The baseline values are summarized in Table 1 .
A period is a year and we assume that discount factor is 0:96. The formal tax rate F t is assumed to be the "all-in" marginal tax rate for employees.
According to OECD (2004a), this tax rate includes personal income tax and employee social security contributions less cash bene…ts. We use the marginal tax rate because it may in ‡uence decisions on how many hours to work, as it gives the amount of extra wage income an individual worker keeps after taxes 9 . For the United States, the "all-in" tax rate is 29:1 percent, which implies assume that the cost of paying these bene…ts is zero. This re ‡ects the fact that agents will self-report their eligibility to receive bene…ts, but may not do so to pay taxes.
To construct the tax rate on informal income (
we must identify values for the probability of detecting an informal worker ( ) and the penalty for tax evasion ( ).
In practice, public enforcement is often characterized by low probabilities of detection.
According to Andreoni et al. (1998) The tax rate applied to a person who evades taxes or works underground is generally imposed as a percent of the additional tax payable and vary according to the seriousness of the o¤ence. In the United States, administrative penalties are applied at 9 Average tax rates may in ‡uence the decision to enter (or exit) the labor market, as they e¤ect how much total net income after tax changes if one decides to join (or exit) the labor market. The average "all-in" tax rate for the U.S. is 24:1 percent. The results presented in the next section are not sensitive to the choice between marginal and average tax rates.
rates of 20 and 75 percent of the portion of underpaid tax or fraud, respectively (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998) . We assume the midpoint 48 percent as our baseline value.
We choose the government expenditures parameter g t so that the size of the government corresponds to 20 percent of formal output at the resulting Ramsey equilibrium; see OECD data in the Appendix. The government incurs costs to collect formal and informal taxes s We calibrate the production technology parameter . Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) estimate the size of the shadow economies for 110 countries. We use this estimate as a proxy for tax evasion in our exercise. They estimate that the size of the informal sector (% of GDP) is 8:7 percent for the United States in 2000. The production parameter is chosen so that the size of the informal sector corresponds to 8:7 percent and satis…es the following expression derived from the consumer and …rm …rst order conditions: 
Accounting for Deviations from the Friedman Rule
In this section we …x the enforcement spending parameter ( ), probability of detection ( ), technology parameter ( ), elasticity of substitution parameter ( ) and preference parameters ( ; v) at the United States values. We change the tax enforcement policies, Canada, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. For Denmark, the optimal interest rate is 7:2 percent, which is higher than the observed rate. The model underpredicts the interest rates for most of the countries, e.g. Greece, Portugal and the United Kingdom, suggesting a lower optimal interest rate, given all other parameters …xed at the U.S. level.
Regarding the optimal in ‡ation rate, the model predicts rates higher than those observed in OECD data for most countries. In Italy, the optimal in ‡ation rate is 6:9 percent, higher than the observed rate of 2:4 percent. The model performs fairly well for Austria, France, New Zealand, Spain, the United States and the United Kingdom. Among Euro Area countries, optimal in ‡ation and interest rates are higher than the current levels for Belgium and Italy, but lower for Greece.
As pointed out before, both in ‡ation and interest rates have converged to one digit rates for the majority of OECD countries. However, the predicted optimal interest rate and in ‡ation vary considerably across countries when country-speci…c tax enforcement policies ( F t ; b t and t ) are taken into account. The results presented in Figure 2 suggest that if …scal institutions were considered, it would be optimal for these countries to have di¤erent in ‡ation and interest rates. For the Eurozone countries in particular, the coordination of monetary policy does not re ‡ect, and apparently does not consider, di¤erences in tax enforcement policies among its members. 
Constructed Informal Enforcement Spending Parameter
In this section, we obtain an estimate of informal enforcement spending parameter for each country. We assume that the observed long term nominal interest rate on government bonds in 2005 is the optimal interest rate, which is given by the solution to the Ramsey problem. For each country parameter is calibrated so that the following expression is satis…ed:
where
, is the work-leisure time allocation parameter, v is the risk aversion term and l I t is determined endogenously. Given common preference and technology parameters, and country-speci…c tax enforcement policies, (28) gives an estimate of for each country.
For the baseline economy, the United States, the calibrated collection spending for the informal sector, , is 0:261. This means that tax authorities spend US$ 26 to collect US$ 100 of informal taxes, which is 50 times the formal tax collection cost (s If the current nominal interest and in ‡ation rates were optimal for these economies, we would have expected relatively similar informal enforcement spending parameters. According to Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) , the size of the informal sector in these countries represents more than 20 percent of the GDP, while our model suggest …gures around 10 percent of the GDP. These results indicate that other factors, in addition to enforcement parameters, F t ; b t ; t , also contribute to the size of the informal sector.
Standard explanations, that we do not incorporate in our model but are not inconsistent with it, are complexity of business registration and tax laws, credit market access, labor market ‡exibility, etc. 10 
Sensitivity Analysis
To derive the results presented so far, preference parameters ( ; v), elasticity of substitution parameter ( ) and the probability of detection ( ) were kept at the baseline levels.
However, they may di¤er across countries. We observe that the share of informal labor in production ( ) increases with the elasticity of substitution parameter , which re ‡ects the substitutability between formal and informal labor in the production function. If it is easy to move from the formal to the informal sector, the optimal interest rate and in ‡ation are lower. As parameter increases, the agent is more visible to the tax authorities (Lemieux et al., 1998) . This increases the expected informal tax revenue for the government, reducing its necessity to rely on in ‡ation to …nance its expenditures. This result di¤ers from previous studies that suggested that the higher is, the higher the interest rate and in ‡ation will be. When the tax system is incomplete, as in Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) and Yesin (2004) , higher substitutability between formal and informal labor implies that agents will move easily from the formal to the informal sector. Since the government has no instruments to detect and tax informal activities, it must rely on an in ‡ation tax to raise revenue and …nance its expenditures. In our model, the government is able to imperfectly collect tax revenue from the informal sector, relying less on seigniorage revenue.
Policies that create incentives to work in the formal sector and improve enforcement of tax legislation decrease both the optimal interest rate and in ‡ation. Either a higher probability of detection or more generous bene…ts a¤ect optimal monetary policy by reducing distortions in the economy. Bene…ts, however, have a greater impact on the 10 optimal interest rate. In other words, the optimal interest rate is more elastic relative to bene…ts than to the detection probability. For instance, if we double the probability of detection relative to its baseline value ( = 0:0093), the predicted interest rate drops from 2:54 to 2:03 percent for the United States. On the other hand, for bene…ts twice the baseline value (b = 0:08), the reduction is greater, from 2:54 to 1:86 percent. In the presence of informal activities and tax evasion, the results suggest that policies that reward work in the formal sector are more e¤ective.
Policy Implications
The model considers two distortions, namely a costly tax enforcement system and tax evasion.
In this section, we analyze the main determinants of the optimal interest rate and in ‡ation when the Friedman Rule is not optimal. In other words, we ask if di¤erent tax enforcement policies and enforcement spending can explain deviations from the Friedman rule. Tax enforcement spending plays an important role as it re ‡ects the distortions associated with agents' non-compliance with tax legislation, which in turn a¤ects the optimal monetary policy. Moreover, the tax evasion penalty provides an alternative to an in ‡ation tax in economies with tax evasion and informal activities.
The optimal monetary policy depends on the enforcement technology, as well as on tax enforcement policies. A positive interest rate and in ‡ation are optimal when enforcement spending is positive and tax enforcement is imperfect. If the government can only tax informal workers and tax evaders with a given (small) probability, it is optimal to increase the in ‡ation tax and deviate from the Friedman rule. The tax on money, a positive in ‡ation tax, is a way for the government to reduce distortions from the informal sector and to compensate for tax revenue not collected from these activities. We quantify the e¤ects of tax enforcement policies to the extent to which optimal monetary policy should deviate from the Friedman rule. In previous sections, we have shown that optimal in ‡ation and interest rates di¤er across countries. These results are mainly driven by di¤erences in tax enforcement policies, given that we assume the same enforcement spending parameter for all countries.
This model casts doubt upon the desirability and sustainability of the recent convergence in interest rates and in ‡ation in OECD countries. Moreover, this quantitative exercise identi…es a concern raised by Sargent and Wallace (1981) have not yet coordinated their …scal policies. The evidence for the lack of …scal policy coordination is both direct ( Previous studies have attempted to explain deviations from the Friedman Rule in the presence of tax evasion and informal activities. In Nicolini (1998) , the quantitative e¤ect of tax evasion on the optimal monetary policy is small, even in economies with large underground sectors. Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) show that the optimal in ‡ation rate ranges from 0 to 22 percent, depending on the size of the informal sector. Yesin (2004) explores the relevance of tax collection costs (the cost to collect formal taxes). Her model performs well only for a small group of countries and the optimal interest rate ranges from 5 to 43 percent 11 . In Koreshkova (2006) , the optimal policy takes into account the ine¢ ciency of the informal sector. However, the optimal in ‡ation rate delivered by her model is much higher than those observed in the data, e.g., an optimal in ‡ation rate of 80 percent per annum for economies with an informal sector and 70 percent for the formal sector. My model predicts a low optimal in ‡ation rate even for countries with large informal sectors. For instance, Italy has an informal sector equivalent to 27 percent of the GDP and the optimal in ‡ation rate is below 10 percent.
All four studies share a similar feature, i.e., the government fails to detect and tax informal activities and tax evaders. The tax system is incomplete and the government is constrained to set the tax on informal income equal to zero. The key feature of our model is to recognize that the government has the additional tools needed to deal with tax evasion and informal activities, namely, evasion penalties, bene…ts for agents that pay income taxes and the probability detection, which can be used to reduce …scal distortions.
We take into account tax enforcement spending and derive optimal policy. The Friedman rule result still fails, as would be expected, but optimal deviations are smaller.
Conclusions
In this paper we show that, in the presence of tax evasion and informal activities, the optimal monetary policy takes into account tax enforcement policies and spending on enforcement. Positive in ‡ation and interest rates are optimal when enforcement spending is positive and tax enforcement is imperfect, i.e., the Friedman rule is not optimal. Tax enforcement policies, namely, bene…ts, evasion penalties and collection spending, can justify modest deviations from the Friedman Rule, i.e. evasion penalties and bene…ts can reduce distortions.
In an economy with tax evasion, the main policymaking lesson drawn from our study is that improved tax collection policies and procedures are relevant to monetary policy.
The enforcement spending parameter and tax enforcement policies play an important role in determining optimal monetary policy and they vary across countries. This quantitative exercise identi…es a concern regarding the need for coordination of monetary and …scal policies. Eurozone countries have coordinated their monetary policies, but still lack …scal policy coordination. The model clearly indicates that if countries have di¤erent tax enforcement policies and enforcement spending, then the optimal interest rate and in ‡ation will be di¤erent. 
